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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAMDAR & COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 900539-CA
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR.,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF
JURISDICTION
This matter was initially appealed to the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(1953 as amended) in that the appeal was taken from a final order
of the Fourth Judicial District Court over which the Utah Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

See

On or about

November 1, 1990, this matter was assigned to the Utah Court of
Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from an Order of Dismissal for Lack of
Jurisdiction by the Fourth Judicial District Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The following is the sole issue presented by this appeal,
expressed in terms and circumstances of the case, but without
unnecessary detail:
Whether the Fourth Judicial District Court (the
"District Court") has specific personal jurisdiction over
the appellees to resolve a dispute over the payment of fees
for accounting and financial services rendered by the
appellants for the benefit of the appellees.

These services

were rendered by the appellant, located in Utah, pursuant to
an oral contract with the appellees, located in California.
The appellant performed similar services in Utah for the
appellees for 18 years.

No services were ever performed for

the appellees by the appellants in California.

Instead, for

over 18 years the appellees would send or otherwise have
delivered to appellant in Utah all their accounting and
financial reports, records and other documentation necessary
for the appellant to perform various accounting services and
then send the resulting work product to the appellees in
California.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a standard of appellate review, this issue is subject to
review under the "correction of error" standard as the District
2

Court's decision was based solely on the pleadings filed in the
case and involved no assessment of witness credibility or
competency.

See T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988).

Thus, this Court is in "as good as position as the

trial court to examine the evidence de novo and determine the
facts."

In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916,918

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
STATEMENT OF STATUTES
The interpretation of Utah's Long-Arm Statute may be
necessary in the resolution of this issue:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination,
that the public interest demands the state provide its
citizens with an effective means of redress against
nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal
contacts with the state, incur obligations to citizens
entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action
is deemed necessary because of technological progress which
has substantially increased the flow of commerce between
several states resulting in increased interaction between
persons of this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 29, 1990, appellant Kamdar & Company filed a
complaint against the appellees in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in the State of Utah to recover $24,336.00 for unpaid
3

accounting and financial services.

In response, on April 13,

1990, the appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction.

This Motion was granted on July 12, 1990

on the basis that the District Court lacked either specific or
general personal jurisdiction over the appellees.

On August 24,

1990, appellant Kamdar & Company filed its Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
1.

Appellant Kamdar & Company is a Utah partnership, that

has operated as an accounting and financial counselling business
within the State of Utah since 1971.

(See R. 1 & 77; Exhibit "A"

at 1 3; Exhibit "C" at f 1).
2.

Appellee Laray Company, Inc. ("Laray Company") is a

California corporation.

(See R. 1, 2, 46, 47, 49 & 50; Exhibit

"C" at I 2).
3.

Appellees Raymond Boal and James A. Boal, Jr., are or

have been the principle officers and shareholders of Laray

1

For purposes of this appeal, the following pleadings or
other documentation, all of which comprise the underlying record on
appeal, are attached hereto as exhibits and will be utilized and
referred to as follows:
1.
Affidavit of Vin Kamdar, filed in the District Court
on May 14, 1990, as Exhibit "A";
2.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, filed in the District Court on
April 25, 1990, as Exhibit "B"; and
3.
Complaint filed in the District Court on January 29,
1990, as Exhibit "C".
4

Company and are both individuals residing in the State of
California.

(See R. 2, 46, 47, 49 & 50; Exhibit

,f

C" at 55 3 &

4).
4.

In or about 1971, James A. Boal, Jr., as president of

Laray Company, then a sole proprietorship, contacted Vin Kamdar,
regarding the desire to have him perform on-going accounting and
financial services for him and his company.

(See R. 47, 48, 50,

51, 76 & 77; Exhibit "A" at 5 2). During that initial meeting.
Mr. Kamdar informed Mr. Boal that he was relocating his business
to Utah, but would be willing to perform the accounting services
sought by Laray Company and Mr. Boal. in Utah.
agreed to this arrangement.

The parties

(See R. 76 & 77; Exhibit "A" at f

2).
5.

Accordingly, in or about 1971, Kamdar & Company, after

moving to Utah, commenced performing diverse accounting and
financial services to Laray Company and James A. Boal, Jr., from
Utah and sent it's work product, including reports, returns,
statements and comparisons to Laray Company and James A. Boal,
Jr., in California.

(See R. 77; Exhibit MB" at 5 3). No

accounting or financial services were ever performed by Kamdar &
Company for the appellees in California.

(See R. 3, 77 & 78;

Exhibit MAM at ff 5 & 7; Exhibit "C" at J 9).

5

6.

Laray Company and Mr. Boal were billed for these

accounting and financial services by Kamdar & Company annually.
As a result, Laray Company and Mr. Boal's payments to Kamdar &
Company would always be one year in arrears.

(See R. 78 & 79;

Exhibit "A" at f 8).
7.

Commencing in or about 1974, Raymond Boal (the son of

James A. Boal) contacted Kamdar & Company in Utah and requested
that it begin performing various additional personal accounting
and financial services for him, including, but not limited to
advising him on real estate transactions, tax planning and
personal financing.

These services were similarly performed in

Utah with the resulting work product being sent to California.
(See R. 77; Exhibit "A" at 5 4).
8.

From 1971 and continuing uninterrupted for the next 18

years, Kamdar & Company rendered virtually all of the appellees'
accounting and financial advising needs, including, but not
limited to the preparation of corporate and personal tax returns,
bank summary reports, industry comparisons, corporate financial
statements, comparative financial statements, monthly general
ledger reports and consultation on investment, management, real
estate and banking matters.

During this entire time all of these

services were performed in Utah with resulting work product sent
to the appellees in California.

Kamdar & Company never performed
6
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financial advice and services rendered by Kamdar & Company,

(See

R. 80; Exhibit "B" at 5 9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Each requirement is fully met to invoke specific personal
jurisdiction under Utah's Long-Arm Statute over the appellees.
First, the fact that the appellees hired appellants to perform
exclusively in Utah various accounting and financial services for
their benefit for over 18 years and indisputably affected
business and persons within the State of Utah pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1) (1953, as amended).

Second, this very

activity is the conduct on which the present claims arise.
Finally, the appellees chose to use the appellant, a Utah
company, to do their accounting and other financial needs for 18
years on an annual basis, coupled with their refusal to pay for
these services justifies a finding based on all notions of
fairness and substantial justice that the appellees come to Utah
to explain why they so refuse to pay the appellant, a Utah
company.

The District Court does have specific personal

jurisdiction over the appellees.
ARGUMENT
This appeal has been filed to seek review of the District
Court's ruling that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over
the appellees.

The District Court's ruling is inapposite to both
8

Lcable

be

discussed herein, the District Court does have specific personal
jurisdiction over the appellees.
A.

over

The Requirements To Establish Specific Personal
Jurisdiction Are Distinctive From Those To Establish
General Personal Jurisdiction.

appellees rests with the preliminary distinction between

"genera:

"specific" personal jurisdiction.

The appellant
the

appellees under Utah's Long-Arm Statute.

The appellant has not

asserted that general jurisdiction exists based upon thr
appellees doing business

lstinction JS eritu.al,

This point, the appellees eventually conceded,

I LULL R- ""»U # But

distinction between general and specific personal
urisdiction has been fully embraced by the Utah courts.2 As
2
Earlier Utah case law that failed to make this distinction has
been effectively abandoned. This point was recently addressed by
the United States District Court for the District of Utah in Nova
Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986). In Nova
Mud, the court found that under current Utah law, the courts have
"rejected its [the Utah courts] prior statements that any
distinction between 'doing business1 and 'minimum contact' was
semantic rather than substantive."
Tel, -it 3 125.
The court
continued:
By making that recognitionii
Utah court brought into
question a number or prior precedents which essentially
applied the 'doing business' test even with the long-arm
9

discussed in Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp,.
578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978):
General personal jurisdiction is the concept reflected in a
doing business statute, which requires substantial and
continued local activity; specific personal jurisdiction is
the concept applicable to a long-arm statute, which requires
only minimum local contacts. . . . Where a defendant's
forum-state activity is extensive, the forum may assert
personal jurisdiction on either related or unrelated claims
(doing business concept). Where the defendant has only
minimum contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may
be asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's
forum-state activity (long-arm or transaction of business
concept).
Appellant does not attempt (nor need it attempt do so) to
establish that the appellees have had substantial and continuous
activity within Utah to invoke the court's general jurisdiction.
(See R. 37-41).

Rather, appellant has always maintained that the

statute was asserted as the basis for invoking jurisdiction.
In any event, it is clear that the Utah court now adheres to
the Utah legislature's mandate that standards be no more
restrictive than those under federal due process limitations.
Id.
The Nova Mud court even pointed out some of these now
obsolete opinions. These included Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics
Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) and Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen &
Co. , 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976). See Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher,
supra, 648 F.Supp. at 1125 n.l. These two cases are two of the
three central cases cited by the appellees in their attempt to
attack the District Court's jurisdictional authority. The third
case White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976) suffers
from the same now rejected premise. (See R. 37-39).

10

Court specific personal jurisdiction over the case.
evidenced h]r several unopposed operative facts,

Thi-

1 = i :i :i:i t:i all • :i)i: a]

contract

entered into between the

parties In :i 9 i Ill included the understanding that al ] the services
would

be performed :li i i I J te L1 1 (S e e Statement :: f t:

"Facts") at f 1 ) ; (2) the appel lant performed these requested
accounting and financing services I i I Utal i for 18 years for the

these services was renewed or terminable each year, thereby
making the fees that are owing

the present case
i

California, and Kamdar & Company,
^resent case
. t"

- r ..3es

(See Facts al, % 1 I)
by the appellees.

:

" rtah (See Facts ?*

i

based on L U G collection of
appellees contacts with tl :ic= State

>

. ; of these facts have been controverted
These facts undisputab 1 n n-slablisl

i |n 11 i

facie showing that the District Court has specific personal
jurisdiction over t
\\<•> i ' • i ( i"" i

resolution of the payment for these very

""i*iu A n d e * « ^ ; „,v..L. Aiiei; i c a n S o c i e t y

148 Utah Adv. Rep

(November 15, 1990).

o f Plastic Surgeons,

B.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over The Appellees Based
On Utah's Long-Arm Statute.

The governing statutory law over this issue is Utah's LongArm Statute.
amended).

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22 et seq. (1953, as

The scope and purpose of this statute has been

codified in section 78-27-22 of the Utah Code, which, in
pertinent part, provides:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination,
that the public interest demands the state provide its
citizens with an effective means of redress against
nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal
contacts with the state, incur obligations to citizens
entitled to the state's protection. . .
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident Appellees to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah courts have consistently complied with this policy
declaration and have given themselves jurisdiction to the fullest
extent allowed under the due process of law.

See, e.g., Parry v.

Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1989);
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah
1985); Brown v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980).
appellees also conceded these facts.

12

(See R. 68 & 69).

The

C.

All Requirements Are Met To confer On The District
Court Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over The
Appellees.
Supreme Court has recently again reaffirmed that

governed,

ion to Utah's Long-Arm Statute, by meeting due

process requirements as determined under federal jurisdictional
nnderson v. American society of Plastic Surgeons,
Utah AT...

" (November 15. 1990"

Fletcher

F.Supr:
. .

Lcient

i

See also Nova Mud Corp. v.

ULCUS

m v o k e specific personal jurisdiction must

include three features: (1) * ?,.• activity must fall under at least
one

L

Long-Arm Statute (see McGee v, International Life Insurance Co,,
355 U.S. 220', 223 (II 95 7)); (2) the controversy must arise
I IIi

of

11 !:i ::i I:: (se e I lanson v. penckla

and (J) the? assertion of jurisdiction must

' violate the

notions of fair play and substantial justice (see International
Shoe Co* v. Washington,

.

Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988),

See accord
Each of these

elements are fully satisfied in the present case.
1.

The appellees have engaged in the transaction of
business within Utah.

The first step i i I a long-arm jurisdictional analysis is to
establish that the party's conduct falls with the purview of one

of the enumerated statutory provisions.

In pertinent part, Utah

law provides:
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state . . .
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(1) (1953, as amended)(Emphasis added).
What "transaction of business within this state" entails is
defined in Section 78-27-23(2) of the Utah Code as "activities of
a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this
state which affect persons or businesses within the state of
Utah."

(Emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court has given

expansive construction to this definition, finding that a person
may transact business within the state without a physical
presence in Utah.

See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701

P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).

This liberal construction finds

similar support in the United States Supreme Court.

See, e.g..

McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.. 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957) .
In the present case the appellees have for the past 18 years
employed on an annually renewable basis the services of the
appellant, a Utah partnership. (See Facts at 5 8). The appellees
have had actual knowledge that during all of this time, the
14

appellant has been located in Utah.
appellees

have sent

appellant

(See Facts

its account books and records to tin;?
/ered payment for such services to
11 II (111 1

1 I 11 II 111

I I'11." i

I I

I II I I II III I II H i

conversations regarding the services it wished the appellant to
perform and received counsel regarding its conduct of business
I ml i" mi i nil 1 1 I y ,

(See '••

appellees continued use ol appellant's services i i i Utah enabled
them to reap • tl: le financial savings of paying Utah rates, rather
S- ::: n i tl in = :t: i 1 Ca] :i f ::)i: i i:i a i: a te .s f DI tl lese sei: v\:i ces

These

activities evidences that the appellees conduct clearly has
affected persons and businesses within the State c f IJtal: i
required by statute. See also Nova Mud Corp, v. Fletcher,
F.Supp. 1123, 1126 (D. Utah 1986).
2.

The appellant' s claims a n so uut. o 1 t.he appe 11 ees ""
contacts in Utah,

whether the claims asserted arise out <
forum state.

the conduct with the

See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U S

235i 251-52 (1958).

tjr s c c: i"

forum state can

established the "general" jurisdictional test

•V-F "doing business" within the state need not hup mrl , j, U, ; Nov a
Mucl

Q0rx>%

Ym

Fletcher, supra. Mil h'.Supp. ••

see also McGee

v. International Life Insurance Co,, supra. 355 U.S. at 223
(1957).
In the instant case, the very claims asserted by the
appellant arises from the connection the appellees have with
Utah.

Namely, the appellees1 contact in Utah is their contracts

with the appellant to do accounting work and business counselor
for them.

The instant dispute is over these very services.

(See

Facts at 5 11). Accordingly, the Hanson requirements are fully
satisfied.
3.

The assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with
notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The final step in this jurisdictional analysis is the
determination of whether the court's assertion of jurisdiction
over the appellees is consistent with federal due process
"notions of fair play and substantial justice."

International

Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316.

The Utah Supreme

Court has adopted this concept holding that the central concern
under this third step is "the relationship of the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation to each other."

Mallory Engineering v.

Ted R. Brown & Associates. 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1980); See
also American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers
Maatschappij. 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983).
Under this analysis, once it has been established that the
claims arose from the activity that the appellees conducted
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appellees to defend their refusal to pay for these services here
in Utah.
Furthermore, at the end of any given year, the appellees
could have chosen a new accountant, one located in California.
Yet, this the appellees chose not to do.

For year after year the

appellees renewed their contracts with the appellant to fulfill
their accounting and financial needs.

Each time the appellees

renewed these agreements, they openly acknowledged their
awareness and acceptance that they were doing business with a
Utah company in Utah.
do.

This they freely and consistently chose to

By so doing, they subjected themselves to the specific

personal jurisdiction of the District Court to resolve the
present dispute over these very fees.

Balancing the interests of

the state with the inconvenience to the appellees, the court's
extension of jurisdiction over the appellees is a reasonable and
valid exercise of its jurisdictional power.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on all relevant facts and applicable law the District
Court erred in finding that it lacked specific personal
jurisdiction over the appellees.

The facts are not in dispute.

The appellees chose to hire the appellant with actual knowledge
at that time that the appellant would be relocating to Utah.

For

the next 18 years, the appellees annually hired the appellant to
18

perform accounting and financial services for them.
services were performed in Utah.

All of these

This included having all

necessary documentation sent or brought to Utah as well as
numerous telephone conversations between the parties. All
services were paid by the appellees, with the exception of the
services rendered during the appellant's final year of
employment.
Utah's Long Arm Statute provides the maximum allowable
protection to residents against nonresidents of Utah under the
Constitution.

This protection extends, under the present facts,

to conferring specific personal jurisdiction on the District
Court over the appellees, based on appellees contacts with the
state of Utah.

First, the ongoing retention of the appellant's

services by the appellees satisfies the statutory requirement
that the appellees affected persons or businesses within the
State of Utah.

Second, the appellees' hiring of the appellant is

the very contact underlying this instant dispute.

Finally, due

to the appellees' annual decision to use the appellant, a Utah
company, the continuous contact with the appellants in the form
of documentation being sent to Utah and telephone conversations
discussions, and the appellees actual knowledge that they were
doing business with a company in Utah, satisfies all due process

19

concerns in requiring the appellees to come to Utah to resolve
the present dispute.
Accordingly, the District Court's ruling should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December, 1990.
JONES, WAHDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

f. Walker
150(0" Kirst Interstate Plaza
L70 Soiyth Main Street
Lt Lake City, Utah
(801) 521-3200
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 14th day of December, 1990
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to the following:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mark J. Perrizo
WILSON, WILSON & PERRIZOy
10901 Paramount Bouleva
Downey, CA 90241

21

Exhibit A

T?LE0 IN
4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATE C r "TAH
IT," ' - \ - 7 Y

hf|7

II i s AH '30

Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

KAMDAR & COMPANY,
AFFIDAVIT OF VIN KAMDAR
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 9004000079
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, Jr.,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

ss.

Vin Kamdar, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
1.

I am the general partner of Kamdar & Company, a

Utah partnership doing business in the State of Utah and as such
I have personal knowledge of the information stated herein.
2.

In or about 1971, James A. Boal, Jr., acting as

president of the Laray Company, then a sole proprietorship,
entered into an oral contract with me to have certain accounting

and financial services for him and his company performed on an
on-going basis. At that time, I told Mr.Boal I was relocating my
business to Utah and would be happy to perform these services for
him in Utah. Mr. Boal agreed to this arrangement.
3.

Accordingly, in or about 1971, I moved to Utah and

Kamdar & Company began performing the accounting and financial
services as requested by Mr. Boal, personally and in behalf of
the Laray Company.
4.

In or about 1974, Mr. James A. Boal, Jr. , at my

advise and counsel incorporated the Laray Company.

Kamdar &

Company continued to render diverse accounting and financial
services to Mr. James A. Boal, Jr. and the Laray Company.
Additionally, beginning around this time Kamdar & Company also
began rendering various financial services to Raymond Boal,
including, but not limited to real estate transactions, tax
planning and personal financing.
5.

At all times, the defendants understood that all

these accounting and financial services both personal and
corporate would be and were being performed in Utah.

This

required having all the books and records of the individuals and
the Laray Company, including, but not limited to check stubs,
payroll reports, monthly sale reports, and copies of loan
contracts either sent or delivered to Utah.
always complied with this necessity.

The defendants have

As a result, all the work

and review on these records and documents by Kamdar & Company
occurred in Utah.
2

6.

Throughout these 18 years, the defendants have

corresponded by mail and telephone on countless occasions with
the plaintiff regarding the performance of the accounting
responsibilities for them by Kamdar & Company.

Countless

conversations were also had by mail and telephone between the
defendants and the plaintiff regarding business advise, planning
and opportunities. All of these correspondence took place
between Utah and California.
7.

No accounting or bookkeeping services were ever

rendered to the defendants by Kamdar & Company while I was a
resident of California. Rather, all work performed for and in
behalf of the defendants by Kamdar & Company was done in Utah.
This work commenced in or about 1971 and continuing for eighteen
years.

During this time, Kamdar & Company performed all

accounting services for the Laray Company, various personal
accounting and financial services for James A. Boal, Jr. and
Raymond Boal, this included, but not limited to the preparation
of corporate tax returns, bank summary reports, industry
comparisons, comparative financials, corporate financial
statements, monthly general ledger reports, consultation on
investments, management, real estate and banking matters, and
personal tax and financing advice and document preparation.
8.

The instant dispute arose when the defendants

refused, after repeated demands, to pay for services rendered by
Kamdar & Company during the final year of employment with the
defendants.

As was the custom established throughout the time
3

Kamdar & Company was employed by the defendants, their bills were
always paid one year in arrears.

As a result, the greater

portion of the amount currently owing by the defendants to Kamdar
& Company is for the immediately preceding year prior to its
termination•

Additional amounts are owing for final accounting

services rendered as requested by the defendants•
9.

The amount owing to Kamdar & Company by the

defendants includes both corporate and personal tax and financial
advice and services.
\(

DATED this

day of May, 19^0.

by: V<W

l/\CM~^

Vin Kamdai
STATE OF UTAH

ss.
COUNTY OF

)

On the

Wfr

day of May, 1990, personally appeared

before me Vin Kamdar, the signerflof;tjte foregoing instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that he m

ed t h e s a m e .

kky^L

JOTJ&Y PUBLIC
Lding a t :
My Commission E x p i r e s :
NOTABY PUBLIC
JlftftB V I t WALKER
ITOSoatftllmnSt

S*»L*MC«y UUh 64101
My Commission Expires

MsrcnS 1994

STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

\y day of May,1990. I caused

to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit
of Vin Kamdar to the following:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Defendants
311 South State Street
Suite 380
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 81H111-2379
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Exhibit B

Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KAMDAR & COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR.,

Civil NO. 9004000079

Defendants.

Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, submits the following Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
INTRODUCTION
This action arises from the failure of the defendants
to pay for certain accounting and business services rendered in
Utah by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff is a Utah partnership

operating an accounting and financial counselling business in
Utah.

The corporate defendant Laray Company, Inc. ("Laray") is a

California corporation.

The defendants Raymond and James Boal

are both residents in California.

For the past 18 years, the plaintiff and the defendants
have had an ongoing contractual arrangement whereby the plaintiff
rendered yearly, quarterly and monthly accounting services, as
well as ongoing business advice to the defendants.

For all of

these 18 years the plaintiff has been located in Utah.

On or

about March 24, 1989, the plaintiff submitted to Laray a bill for
various accounting services in the amount of $26,194.00.

On or

about May 12, 1989, the defendant Raymond Boal, as the new
president of Laray, replied by letter refusing full payment.
The plaintiff has made repeated demands for payment for
these rendered services, but the defendants have and continue to
refusal to pay.

The defendants refusal has required the

plaintiff to file the instant action to recover such amounts
owing from the defendants.

ARGUMENT
The defendants have filed the instant motion alleging
that this Court is without jurisdiction over the parties.
This claim is wrong.

This Court does have specific personal

jurisdiction over the defendants based on their contacts
with the State of Utah.
I.

THIS COURT HAS SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEFENDANTS.
A.

There Is A Critical Distinction Between Specific And
General Jurisdiction.
The issue in dispute is simple:

Does this court have

specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.
2

The governing statutory law is Utah's Long-Arm Statute.
Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22 et seq. (1953, as amended).

See Utah

The scope and

purpose of this statute has been codified in section 78-27-22 of
the Utah Code, which, in pertinent part, provides:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination,
that the public interest demands the state provide its
citizens with an effective means of redress against
nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal
contacts with the state, incur obligations to citizens
entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action
is deemed necessary because of technological progress which
has substantially increased the flow of commerce between
several states resulting in increased interaction between
persons of this state and persons of other states. The
provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this stater should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah courts have consistently complied with this
policy declaration and have given themselves jurisdiction to the
fullest extent allowed by the due process of law.

See, e.g.,

Brown v. Carnes Corp.r 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980).
In the instant case, the issue of whether this court
has jurisdiction over the defendants rests with the distinction
between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction.

It is this

distinction which the defendants have failed to recognize.
Simply, the plaintiff asserts specific personal jurisdiction over
the defendants based on Utah's Long-Arm Statute, rather than
general jurisdiction based upon the defendants doing business in
Utah.

This distinction is critical.

3

1.

The Utah courts have recognized the distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction.
This distinction has been recently and fully embraced

by the Utah courts.

As aptly discussed in Abbott G.M. Diesel v.

Piper Aircraft. 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978):
General personal jurisdiction is the concept reflected in a
doing business statute, which reguires substantial and
continued local activity; specific personal jurisdiction is
the concept applicable to a long-arm statute, which reguires
only minimum local contacts. . . . Where a defendant's
forum-state activity is extensive, the forum may assert
personal jurisdiction on either related or unrelated claims
(doing business concept). Where the defendant has only
minimum contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may
be asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's
forum-state activity (long-arm or transaction of business
concept).
The plaintiff does not attempt nor need it attempt to
assert, as claimed by the defendants, that the defendants have
substantial and continuous activity within Utah to invoke the
court's general jurisdiction.

(See Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp.6-10
(hereinafter "Defendants' Memorandum")).

Rather, the plaintiff

asserts that the defendant's retention of the plaintiff as its
accountant and business advisor for the past 18 years and now
their failure to pay for these services rendered in Utah invokes
this court's specific personal jurisdiction over the resolution
of the payment for these very services.
2.

The defendants have failed to acknowledge the
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction.
The failure of the defendants to acknowledge this

distinction is fatal to their position that this court lacks
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jurisdiction.

This failure is evidenced by the defendant's own

pleading which uniformly cites Utah cases of now questionable
validity.

The cases cited in the Defendants' Memorandum on the

issue of jurisdiction have now been
courts.

abandoned by the Utah

This reality was directly addressed by the United States

District Court for the District of Utah in Nova Mud Corp. v. L.H.
Fletcher, 648 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986).

In Nova Mud, the

court first found that under current Utah law, the courts have
"rejected its [the Utah courts] prior statements that any
distinction between 'doing business' and 'minimum contact' was
semantic rather than substantive."

Id. at-1125.

The court

continued:
By making that recognition, the Utah court brought into
question a number or prior precedents which essentially
applied the 'doing business' test even with the long-arm
statute was asserted as the basis for invoking jurisdiction.
In any event, it is clear that the Utah court now adheres to
the Utah legislature's mandate that standards be no more
restrictive than those under federal due process
limitations.

Id.
The Nova Mudd court even pointed out some of these now
obsolete opinions.

These included United Ski Co. v. Union

Plastic Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) and Cate Rental Co. v.
Whalen & Co.P 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976).

See Nova Mudd Corp. v.

Fletcher, supra. 648 F.Supp. at 1125 n.l.

These two cases are

two of the three central cases cited by the defendants in their
attempt to attack this court's jurisdictional authority.

The

third case White v. Arthur Murray. Inc.. 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976)
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suffers from the same now rejected premise.

(See Defendants'

Memorandum, pp.6-8).
B.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction Is Governed By Due
Process Limitations.
Conduct which is sufficient to invoke long-arm

jurisdiction must include three features: (1) the activity must
fall under at least one of the specifically enumerated statutory
acts (see McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957)); (2) the controversy must arise out of the
activity (see Hanson v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)); and
(3) the assertion of jurisdiction must not violate the notions of
fair play and substantial justice (see International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Each of these elements

are fully satisfied in the instant case.
1.

Defendants Have Engaged In The "Transaction Of Any
Business Within The State".
The first step in a long-arm jurisdictional analysis is

to establish that the party's conduct falls within the purview of
one of the enumerated statutory provisions under Utah's Long-Arm
Statute.

In pertinent part, Utah's long-Arm Statute provides:

Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
fl) the transaction of any business within this state . . .
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(1) (1953, as amended)(emphasis added).
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What "transaction of business within this state"
entails is defined in Section 78-27-23(2) of the Utah Code as
"activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or
representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses
within the state of Utah,"

(Emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme

Court has given an expansive construction to this definition
finding that a person may transact business within the state even
without a physical presence in Utah.

See Brown v. Washoe Housing

Authority, 625 F.Supp. 595, 599 (D.Utah 1985); and Synergetics v.
Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).

This

liberal construction finds similar support in the United States
Supreme Court.

See, e.g.. McGee v. International Life Insurance

Co.. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
In the instant case the defendants have for past 18
years employed the services of the plaintiff, a Utah partnership.
The defendants have had actual knowledge that during all of this
time, the plaintiff has been located in Utah.

The defendants

have sent its account books and records to the plaintiff in Utah,
have delivered payment for such services to the plaintiff in Utah
and have had countless telephone conversations regarding the
services it wished the plaintiff to preform and received counsel
regarding its conduct of business from the plaintiff in Utah.
These activities evidences that the defendants conduct meets the
Utah statute in that they affects persons and businesses within
the State of Utah. See Nova Mudd Corp. v. Fletcher, supra. 648
F.Supp. at 1126.
7

2.

Plaintiff's claims roust arise out of the defendants
activity within Utah.
The second step in a jurisdictional analysis is to

determine whether the claims asserted arise out of the conduct
with the forum state.
52 (1958).

See Hanson v. Dencklaf 357 U.S. 235, 251-

If the nexus between the claim and the party's

conduct with the forum state can be established the "general"
jurisdictional test of "doing business" within the state need not
be met.

Id.; and Nova Mudd Corp. v. FletcherP supra, 648 F.Supp.

at 1126. See also McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
supra. 355 U.S. at 223 (1957).
In the instant case, the very claims asserted by the
plaintiff arise from the connection the defendants have with
Utah.

Namely, the defendant's principal activity within Utah is

their retention of the plaintiff to do accounting and business
counselor work for them.
services.
3.

The instant dispute is over these very

The Hanson requirements are fully satisfied.
The Court's assertion of jurisdiction is consistent
with federal due process.
The final step in our jurisdictional analysis is the

determination of whether the court's assertion of jurisdiction
over the defendants is consistent with federal due process
"notions of fair play and substantial justice."

International

Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316.

The Utah Supreme

Court has adopted this concept holding that the central concern
under this third step is "the relationship of the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, to each other."
8

Mallory Engineering

v, Ted R. Brown & Associates. 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1980); and
American Land Program. Inc. v. Bonaventura Uiteverss
Maatschappii. 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983).
Under this analysis, once it has been established that
the claims arose from the activity in which the defendants
conducted in the state the remaining factor is whether the
defendants7 "conduct and connection with the forum State [is]
such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsonr 444 U.S.

286, 297 (1980).

See also Hanson v. Denckla, supra. 357 U.S. at

252; and Milliken v. Meyer. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

See accord

Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.. Ltd.. supra, 701 P.2d at
1110; Brown v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980); and
Burt Drilling. Inc. v. Portadrill. 608 P.2d 244, 246-47 (Utah
1980).
In the instant case, all the work done by the plaintiff for
the defendant within the time covered by the outstanding bills
was performed in Utah.

Documents, files, and financial material

necessary for the completion of the accounting were shipped to
Utah to for access so that the work could be done within the
state.

Due to the extended nature of this business transaction,

the amount of work done by the plaintiff within the state, the
movement of personal and corporate financial documentation to the
state, the prior history of billing and payments via mail to and
from the state, and the full knowledge of the defendants that
business was being carried on within Utah evidences the intrinsic
9

fairness of requiring the defendants to defend their refusal to
pay for these services here in Utah.

Balancing the interests of

the state with the inconvenience to the defendants, the court's
extension of jurisdiction over the defendants is a reasonable and
valid exercise of jurisdictional power.

CONCLUSION
Utah's Long-Arm Statute vests this court with specific
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

The defendants'

arguments fail to make the critical distinction between general
and specific jurisdiction thereby improperly asserting that this
Court lacks any jurisdictional authority over this matter.
Because of current Utah law which recognizes this distinction and
the defendants meeting the requisite elements to invoke this
courts long-arm jurisdiction, the plaintiff respectfully request
that this Court deny the defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this

T-S day of April, 1990.

JONEfp, fi^L00' HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

^^.L^icy N. Walker
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the £</ day of April, 1990, I
caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the following:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Defendants
311 South State Street
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
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Exhibit C

Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KAMDAR & COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT

vs.
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR.,

C

ivii NO. Qrwrmn

Defendants.

Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record,
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, upon information and
belief, alleges and for causes of action states as follows:

PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Kamdar & Co. is a partnership organized

under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of
business in Utah County, State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon

alleges that defendant Laray, Co., Inc. ("Laray") is a business

organization with its principal place of business in Orange
County, State of California.
3.

Plaintiff is informed and believe and thereon

alleges that the defendant Raymond Boal is an individual and
current president of Laray and resides in Los Angeles County,
State of California.
4.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon

alleges that the defendant James A. Boal, Jr. is an individual
and former president of Laray and resides in Orange County,
State of California.
5.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon

alleges that the defendants Raymond Boal and James A. Boal, Jr.
are guarantors of the debts of Laray.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon

alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over the matters
alleged herein pursuant to the Utah Code Anno. Section 78-27-24
(1953, as amended) in that the defendants' transaction of
business and contracting for services with the plaintiff
occurred within the State of Utah.
7.

Venue of this action is properly vested in this

court pursuant to Utah Code Anno. Section 78-13-1 (1953, as
amended) in that the claims alleged herein occurred as a result

-2-

of the services preformed for the exclusive benefit of the
defendants by the plaintiff within the jurisdiction of this
district, in the State of Utah,

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
8.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by

reference Paragraphs 1 through 7 of this Complaint as though
set forth in full herein.
9.

In or about 1971 through 1988, the plaintiff and

Laray entered into an ongoing contractual arrangement (the
"Contracts") whereby the plaintiff would render on a yearly,
quarterly and monthly basis various financial and tax services,
including, but not limited to the preparation of corporate tax
returns, bank summary reports, industry comparisons,
comparative financials, corporate financial statements and
monthly general ledger reports, as well as financial
consultation on various investment, management, real estate and
banking matters for Laray (hereinafter collectively referred to
as the "Services").
10.

At all times relevant herein the Services

rendered by the plaintiff for the defendants was performed in
Utah for the benefit of Laray's business in California.

-3-

11.

In or about 1971 through 1988, the plaintiff did

rendered Services for Laray, submitted billings and accounting
statements on a monthly, quarterly or yearly basis to Laray for
these Services and Laray paid the plaintiff pursuant to the
billing and accounting statements, pursuant to the Contracts.
12.

In or about early March, 1989, the defendant

James A. Boal, Jr., then president of Laray, informed the
plaintiff that once the last quarter of the 1988 financial and
tax services which the plaintiff was in the process of
completing were finished, as a result of an anticipated change
in management of Laray, the plaintiff's Services would be no
longer required, and requested a final bill and accounting for
all outstanding unpaid Services.
13.

In response to the defendant James A. Boal, Jr.'s

request, on or about March 24, 1989, that the plaintiff
submitted to Laray a final bill and accounting for unpaid
Services rendered for the exclusive benefit of Laray, pursuant
to the Contracts, in the amount of Twenty Six Thousand One
Hundred Ninety Four Dollars ($26,194.00) plus accruing interest
and service charges.

A copy of said final billing and

accounting statement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and
incorporated by reference herein.
14.

On or about May 12, 1989, the defendant Raymond

Boal, as the new president of Laray, replied by letter to the
-4-

plaintiff, acknowledging that the plaintiff had preformed
substantial Services for the benefit of Laray which remained
unpaid, but refused to reimburse the plaintiff for the amount,
as reflected in the plaintiff's March 24, 1989 billing and
accounting statement, claiming that the amount should be
reduced.

A copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit

"B" and incorporated by reference herein.
15.

On or about June 8, 1989, Laray, in further

acknowledgment of the debt it owed to the plaintiff sent the
plaintiff a check in the amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty Two Dollars ($2,382.00).
16.

On or about July 7, 1989 and again on July 21,

1989, the plaintiff responded to the defendant Raymond Boal's
claim that the amount owing to the plaintiff by Laray should be
reduced expressly rejecting this claim and again requesting
that the full amount be paid pursuant to the Contracts between
the plaintiff and Laray.
hereto as Exhibits

W

C" and

A copy of these letters are attached
M

D", respectively and incorporated

by reference herein.
17.

On or about July 25, 1989, the defendant Raymond

Boal, by letter, informed the plaintiff that it would not pay
the plaintiff pursuant to the Contracts, claiming that the
plaintiff's bills for the Services rendered were considered too

-5-

high and that Laray had located other "accounting services"
which would work for less.
hereto as Exhibit
18.

M

A copy of said letter is attached

E" and incorporated by reference herein.

On or about August 16, 1989, the plaintiff, by

letter, again attempted to encourage Laray to fulfill its
commitments under the Contracts and pay the plaintiff for the
Services it had rendered for the exclusive benefit of Laray.
This letter further informed Laray that the defendant Raymond
Boal's earlier acknowledgments that the plaintiff had performed
substantial financial, tax and consulting services and the
corresponding amount Laray was willing to pay failed to account
for all the Services so rendered, as noted in the March 24,
1989 billing and accounting statement.
is attached hereto as Exhibit

M

A copy of said letter

F" and incorporated by reference

herein.
19.

The defendants have failed to make any further

payment in accordance to the Contracts between the plaintiff
and Laray for the Services rendered by the plaintiff for the
exclusive benefit of Laray.
20.

The plaintiff has performed all of its

obligations under the terms of the Contracts.
21.

The plaintiff has demanded that the defendants

pay pursuant to the Contracts, but the defendants have and
continued to refuse to pay such amounts or any portion thereof.
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22.

As a result of the defendants' failure to pay the

amounts owed to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover from the defendants the amount of Twenty Four Thousand
Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00)/ together with
interest thereon at the highest, legal rate as allowed by law
from the date of the defendant's breach of the Contracts, and
judgment should be entered against the defendants and in favor
of the plaintiff in that amount.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the
defendants as set forth hereinafter in Plaintiff's Prayer for
Relief.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Unjust Enrichment)
23.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 22 of this
complaint as though set forth in full herein.
24.

The defendants have been unjustly enriched in the

amount of Twenty Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars
($24,336.00) as a result of the defendants' failure to pay for
the Services rendered by the plaintiff as alleged herein, and
in equity and good conscience, the defendants should not be
permitted to enjoy the benefits of said Services, and the
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plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants the amount
by which the defendants have been unjustly enriched.
25.

For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants

are liable to the plaintiff in the amount of Twenty Four
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00),
together with interest thereon at the highest, legal rate as
allowed by law from the date of the defendant's wrongful
conduct, and judgment should be entered against the defendants
and in favor of the plaintiff in that amount.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
defendant as set forth in Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiff pray:
1.

For judgment against the defendants on each of the

Claims for Relief as noted herein in the amount of Twenty Four
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00),
together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate from
the date of the defendants' breach and/or wrongful conduct;

-8-

2.

For an award of a reasonable attorney's fees,

court costs and expenses incurred in this action; and
3.

For such other and further relief as this Court

may deem equitable and just under the circumstances.
DATED this 3?J day of January, 1990.
JONES, WALDO,I HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By.
Attorn^e
^/

jnw 218/pb
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Walker
for Plaintiff

KAMDAR & CO.
10 SOUTH STATE STREET
LINDON, UT 84042

March 24, 1989

James A. Boal, Jr., President
Laray Co., Inc.
P. 0. Box 462
La Habra, CA 90631

Accounting services rendered:

Preparation of Corp. Tax Returns Fy 86-87. . . .$

5,580.

Preparation of Corp. Tax Returns Fy 87-88. . . .

4,983.

Bank Reporting to Mitsubishi 86-87

4,052c

Bank Reporting to Mitsubishi 87-88

4,152.

Comparative Fianacials 86-87 & 87-88

3,052.

General Ledger Work 7-1-87 to 12-31-88

2,700.

Financials of the Principals 1-1-88

928.

Out of Pocket costs

747 c

Total services rendered

$ 26,194.

If the total payment is not received in 30 days, a late charge of
12.00 per cent will be added to the unpaid balance.
The billing is payable upon receipt.

7//IO
P.O. BOX 462 • LA HABRA. CA 90631

IM 12, 1989

KttDAR & CO.
10 SOUTH STATE STREET
LINDON, UTAH 84042

RE: ACCOUNTING SERVICES RENDERED:

PREPARATION OF CORP. TAX RETURNS FY 87-88
BANK REPORTING TO MITSUBISHI 87-88
COMPARATIVE FIAMACIALS 87-88
GENERAL LEDGER WORK 7-1-87 TO 12-31-88
FINANCIALS OF THE PRINCIPALS 1-1-88 '
TOTAL

4,983.
4,152.
1,526.
'2,700.
928.
14,289.00

LISTED ABOVE IS THE TOTAL AMDUNT OWED TO KAMDAR & CO. BY
LARAY CO., FOR ACCOUNTING SERVICES. PAYMENT WILL BE HADE
IN SIX INSTALLMENTS AT 2,381.50 .

SINCERELY,

RATBOAI—s
PRESIDENT

RB/rl

TAX LOR, MOODY & THORNE, i .J.
ATTORNEYS A N D COUNSELORS AT LAW
FORMERLY

THOMAS S. TAYLOR
ROBERT L. MOODY
D.EUGENE THORNE
' ' '
of Counsel
KAY ALDRICH LINDSAY

CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY
252> NORTH CANYON ROAD
COUNTRY CLUB COURT
on anv n„
P.O. BOX 1466
PROVO, UTAH 84603

TELEPHONE
( g 0 1 ) 373>272l

FAX (801) 375-6293

July 7, 1989

Ray Boal, Jr., President
LaRay Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 462
La Habra, CA 90631
re:

Kamdar v. LaRay Company, Inc.

Dear Mr. Boal:
Your memo dated May 12, 1989, regarding accounting
services rendered by Kamdar & Company has been brought to my
office.
I return a copy of that letter together with a copy of
Kamdar & Company's billing, dated March 24, 1989.
The amount
shown on the March 24, 1989, billing is the amount owed to Kamdar
& Company and not as characterized by yourself.
Should you opt to make monthly installments as you have
suggested in your memo dated May 12, 1989, a 12% interest charge
will be added.
Mr.
Kamdar is sorry that you have chosen not to
continue using his services but that is not a reason to excuse
you from payment of the services previously rendered.
Should this account not be paid in a reasonable period
of time, I have been instructed to turn it over for collection to
correspondent counsel in California.
Should you have any questions concerning
please address them to this office.
Yours very truly,

Robert L. Moody
RLM:cjc
Enclosure

this matter

TArLOR, MOODY & THORNE, P.O.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
FORMERLY

THOMAS S TAYLOR
ROBERT L MOODY
D EUGENE THORNE
• • •
of Counsel
KAY ALDR1CH LINDSAY

CHRISTENSEN. TAYLOR & MOODY
2n<> NORTH CANYON ROAD
COUNTRY CLUB COURT
P O BOX 1466
PROVO. UTAH 8460*

„,
n
TELEPHONE
(801)373-2721
FAX (801) 375-6293

July 21, 1989

LARAY COMPANY, INC,
P.O. Box 462
LaHabra, CA 90631
RE:

Kamdar & Company vs. Laray Company, Inc.

Gentlemen:
Enclosed is Kamdar & Company's billing showing a credit
of your recent payment and the current unpaid balance. Demand is
hereby made upon you to take care of this matter within thirty
(30) days to avoid the necessity of this being referred to
correspondent counsel for legal proceedings.
Should you have questions concerning this matter please
address them to this office.
Yours very truly,

Robert L. Moody &
Attorney at Law
RLM:jsp
Enclosure

linG
AUG

4 1989
P.O. BOX 462 • LA HABRA. CA 90631

July 25, 1989
Robert L. Moody
Taylor, Moody & Thorne, PC
2525 North Canyon Rd.
Provo, Utah 84603
Refrence:

Kamdar Company vs Laray Company, Inc.
Your letter dated July 21, 1989

i '
V^n/1

\jf*
^

Mr* Moody:
With respect to the matter at contest, it is our position that a
compromise agreement be once again considered. It is our contention
that there was a vast disparity between the nature of services rendered
and the corresponding fees charged by Mr. Kamdar. We offer as evidence
the dearth of documentation and product provided to us for Mr. Kamdar's
effort during the billing period. As a point of refrence, under the
exact parallel circumstances, our present accounting services, which
are provided by a Certified Public Accountant, are nowhere near the
level of cost imposed by Mr. Kamdar.
Enclosed is our original letter of compromise for which a corresponding payment and negotition of such payment has been accomplishedc
If the above terms are not acceptable to your client we suggest that
whatever legal remedies may incur under the circumstances be pursued.
Additionally, for your files, there is an interplay between the
subject billing for professional services and a promissory demand note
due to the principal owner of our Company. To avoid a compromise of our
position with respect to this note, (face value $15,000), we ask an
offset to our obligation to that of your clients.

Very truly yours,

President

rl/RB
Exhibit "E"
1801 EAST LAMBERT RD . LA HABRA, CALIFORNIA

//

Q o

TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
FORMFRLY

CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY

THOMAS S TAYLOR
ROBERT L MOODY
D EUGENE THORN'E

2525 NORTH CANYON ROAD
COUNTRY CLUB COURT

TELEPHONE
(801) 373-2721
FAX (801) 375-6293

P O BOX 1466

of Counsel
KAY ALDR1CH LINDSAY

PROVO. UTAH 8460*

August

16,

1989

Ray Boal, Jr., President
LaRay Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 462
La Habra, CA 90631
re:

Kamdar v. LaRay Company, Inc.

Dear Mr. Boal:
Thank you for your letter of July 25, 1989, together
with a copy of your letter addressed to Kamdar & Company, dated
May 12, 1989.
As you can appreciate it is difficult for either myself
or Mr. Kamdar to compare what you're presently paying a CPA to
what you previously paid Kamdar & Company. We have no way of
knowing what the CPA is doing at the present time but we do know
what Mr. Kamdar did in the past and we do know that for many
years he provided services and was paid the fees and it is only
after the fact that you want to adjust the payments to him. We
do not think that that is appropriate.
Referring to your recap of the accounting services
rendered in your letter dated May 12, 1989, you have failed to
include the 1986-1987 preparation of corporate tax returns in the
sum of $5,580.00 and you have failed to include the 1986-1987
banK reporting services which totalled $4,052.00. If you would
have included those figures your total would have been
$23,921.00. It is my opinion that contractually you're obligated
in this amount.
>r\i

We appreciate the spirit of your willingness to try and
resolve this matter as set forth in your letter of July 25, 1989,
and in that same spirit it is our suggestion that the matter be
compromised as follows:
(a)
That
Kamdar owes your Company.

you offset

Exhibit "F

the

$15,000.00 note Mr

Ray Boal, Jr., President
LaRay Company, Inc.
August 16, 1989
Page 2

(b) That you pay Mr. Kamdar $6,600.00 in monthly
payments of $2,200.00 per month over the next three months.
Your considering this matter and prompt reply will be
appreciated.
Yours very truly,

RLM:cjc
cc: Kamdar & Company

Exhibit D

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
********

KAMDAR &COMPANY,

Case No. 900400079

Plaintiff,

DECISION

vs.
LARAY COMPANY INC., et al,
Defendant.
********

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's
Request for a Ruling on defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The

Court assumes that Mr. Walker is intending the Request as a
Notice to Submit for a Decision under Rule 4-501(1)(d) rather
than the cited 4-501(e).

The Court, having considered the the

Motion, accompanying memoranda, and affidavits enters the
following:
DECISION
Defendants contend that this Court has no personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.

The record establishes that

the defendants have an 18 year relationship with the plaintiff
and that for almost all of that time the plaintiff has resided
in Utah and has performed accounting and other financial
services for the defendants in Utah.

However, the record also clearly indicates that the
agreement to have plaintiff render accounting and financial
services for the Laray Company, Inc. was entered into in
California.
Utah.

Furthermore, the defendants do no business in

The only contact that any of the defendants have with

this State is the fact that their accountant works here.

There

is no evidence that the defendants sought out a Utah accountant
to do their financing.

Rather, the accountant moved to Utah

after the contract was made.
This Court finds that the nature and quality of the
defendants' activities relative to the State of Utah are not of
the kind that would subject them to personal jurisdiction
(specific or general).

Plaintiff's reference to Utah Code

78-27-23(2) is inapposite as is its reliance on Synergetics v.
Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985).

Defendants

have never purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting activities within the State of Utah.
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby grants
defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Mr. Jackson is to prepare an Order consistent with
this decision.
DATED, in Provo, this /2 day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT

"GEORGE E^BALLIF, JUDG
cc:

Jeffery Walker
Kevin Jackson

Exhibit E

W KEVIN JACKSON (1640)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorney for Defendant
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379
(8100 531-6600

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Ufahtounty Stati

Deputy

MARK J. PERRIZO
WILSON, WILSON & PERRIZO
Attorney for Defendant
10901 Paramount Blvd.
Downey, CA 90241
IN THE FOURTH JUCICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
KAMDAR & COMPANY
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

v.
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND
BOAL: AND JAMES A. BOAL, JR.,

Civil NMo. 90-040-0079
Judge Ballif

Defendant.
ooOoo
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the Defendants having
been duly called on for hearing before the Court pursuant to
Rule 4-501(1)(d), and the Court having considered the
affidavits and memorandums of points and authorities submitted
by each of the parties and for reasons more fully set forth in
the decision of this Court dated the 12th day of July, 1990,

and upon motion of the Defendants it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1.

The Plaintiff's Complaint against each of the

Defendants is hereby dismissed due to the lack of personal
jurisdiction over the named Defendants,
2.

Th Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is

hereby granted, without prejudice.
DATED t h i s

/ ^f

day of <2j&SfcJJ90.

£6<.*.^6.r*e.

Judge Georpp E. Ballif
\bpr6\Nbd as to Form

jnw 337/pb
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